On Certainty – The Comparison between Spinoza and Zhuangzi's Monism

Abstract

In this paper, the concept of monism is compared between Spinoza and Zhuangzi. Although both ultimately aim at liberation from the autocracy of theology or morality, their ontological starting points differ significantly. Spinoza’s monism is rooted in a rational and deterministic substance, emphasizing certainty and logical necessity, whereas Zhuangzi’s monism arises from an indeterminate Dao, characterized by fluidity and uncertainty. These ontological differences—marked by opposing properties yet situated within the same metaphysical dimension—give rise to fundamentally distinct epistemological frameworks. As a further development, this paper reinterprets Spinoza’s classification of knowledge by introducing new dimensions grounded in the contrast between certainty and uncertainty. This revised framework is then applied to a deeper investigation into the nature of certainty itself, shedding light on how different metaphysical assumptions shape modes of knowing and the limits of human understanding.